



UNSC

Study Guide

LEGACYMUN'23 UNSC STUDY GUIDE

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Letter from Secretary General

Dear participants and shareholders of our heritage.

It is a pleasure for me to announce you the conference LegacyMUN'23, our story, heritage and masterpiece. Our conference, which will appeal to all students internationally, will host a variety of emotions, feelings and memories. The main thing that we need to know that this conference is for "us".

Our conference, which will be a reflection of dozens of events, months and days, draws its existence from the past and the future. We will work with you for a new future for four days with this community, various generations and our team united for a common Earth. We are not affiliated with high schools or universities, we are not here to serve anyone. As a team, we have put our best efforts for this community, and now we will crown all of our efforts. Together with us, you will witness the contrast and combination of various ideas, you will find yourself in a place where you will feel chaos and empathy and there is no pleasure in it.

I know that you all have various lives, ideas, ideologies and values. Legacy promises to live with them, to deeply understand other people's existence, and to show your worth. You are all unique and valuable both for us and for our Earth, we are with you to remind this and to build this wall together. We embrace Model United Nations, our valued stakeholders, our family and our Legacy. Now it is the time to join our story, walk the same path together and protect our Heritage. Let's Unite for Our Legacy.

I greet you all with respect and love, with my whole heart; Welcome.

Kerem Suiçmez
Secretary General of LegacyMUN'23

LETTER FROM UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL

Most Esteemed Delegates and Attendees of LegacyMUN'23,

To introduce myself, I am Yasemin Aydin and I currently study at Besiktas Anatolian High School. I am a proud and honored member of MUNB CLUB.

Being named as the Under-Secretary General of United Nations Security Council for LegacyMUN'23 and of course, desiring myself with the delegates and attendees of LegacyMUN'23 makes me incredibly excited and honored.

To represent the secretariat of the UNSC committee at LegacyMUN'23, I anticipate that the delegates who agree to serve on our committee will learn about the committee's and the agenda items' importance meanwhile developing vulnerable solutions to problems that arise globally and subtly affect the majority of people.

Besides, since the agenda items of the committee are “**Addressing the issue of non-proliferation in relation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) following its conduct of the underground nuclear tests**” and “**Resolving the matter pertaining to the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh**” I would be quite honored and pleased by seeing the willingness regarding the solutions of each agenda from the delegates.

Also, it is urgent and important to keep in mind that for examining the flow of the debate that will be present at committee sessions, the closing statements should be well-read and perfectly understood by the delegates. Any other behaviors and oversteps upon the debate will directly be warned.

Please do not hesitate to reach me in case of any problems with the committee or study guide.

aydinyasemin298@gmail.com is the correct address for you to contact me:)

Kind Regards,

Yasemin AYDIN
Under-Secretary-General



INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The United Nations Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened.

The United Nations Security Council was created as one of the United Nations' six principal organs after World War II. The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. It also traveled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, and in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990.

Year by year, the Security Council gained the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with the existing Member States which comprises five permanent members, including China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly, considering their contributions to international peace, security, and equitable geographical distribution.

The Security Council is expected to meet two sometimes conflicting requirements: first, to make decisions that will ensure prompt and effective action to maintain international peace and security; and second, to gain the support of the wider United Nations membership for such Security Council decisions to be carried out. Enhancing the transparency, efficiency, and inclusiveness of the working methods of the Security Council through meeting these requirements is crucial to the effective functioning of the Council.

The UN Security Council adopts responsibility in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression, presents ways of adjusting the terms of settlement, and encourages parties to a conflict to settle it peacefully.

All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.



When we further examine the Security Council, one may see a major specialty that requires great importance for the going of the working methods, voting system, and the right of veto.

“Article 27 of the UN Charter states that:

Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”

The right of veto can be explained as “if a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine favorable votes.”

However, in LegacyMUN’23, the Security Council will host 20 members separated as 5+1 permanent members, 9 non-permanent members, and 5 observers. The observer members will have the right to submit clauses but shall be supported and approved by a permanent member.

Agenda Item A: Addressing the issue of non-proliferation in relation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) following its conduct of the underground nuclear tests

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA ITEM

Nuclear tests, which are a method that was developed in the middle of the 20th century, nuclear devices are deliberately detonated to investigate their explosive force and evaluate prospective uses. These experiments are carried out to assess the efficiency of nuclear weapons, comprehend the effects of those weapons on different materials and surroundings, and improve the technology that underpins them.

DPRK (aka North Korea) is one of the countries that leads the usage of nuclear tests in a tremendous way.

Besides, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only country to have withdrawn from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to pursue a nuclear weapons program and possesses an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal. The DPRK remains outside of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has repeatedly violated the international norm against nuclear testing by conducting tests in 2006, the test of seven medium and long-range missiles on July 4, 2006, and the partially successful test of a nuclear explosive on October 9, 2006, the international community acted with unity and strength by way of UN resolutions 1695 and 1718 to prevent further tests of missiles, as well as a second nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

But the tests couldn't be prevented and the world faced with several new tests published by DPRK in 2009, and 2013, two tests in 2016, and a test in 2017. North Korea claimed its sixth nuclear test, in September 2017, was of a thermonuclear device.

The United Nations Security Council has passed numerous resolutions condemning North Korea's nuclear activities, and has imposed increasingly harsh sanctions on the North Korean military and economy. In today's world and agenda, again the discussion of underground tests in DPRK is a top question to be urgently answered.

B. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Nuclear Weapons

A nuclear weapon is a device that uses a nuclear reaction to create an explosion. This explosion is much more powerful than that of conventional explosives. When a nuclear weapon explodes, it gives off four types of energy: a blast wave, intense light, heat, and radiation. Nuclear weapons can be in the form of bombs or missiles.

Nuclear weapons produce enormous explosive energy. Their significance may best be appreciated by the coining of the words kiloton (1,000 tons) and megaton (1,000,000 tons) to describe their blast energy in equivalent weights of the conventional chemical explosive TNT.

The first nuclear weapons were bombs delivered by aircraft. Later, warheads were developed for strategic ballistic missiles, which have become by far the most important nuclear weapons. Smaller tactical nuclear weapons have also been developed, including ones for artillery projectiles, land mines, antisubmarine depth charges, torpedoes, and shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

The development of nuclear weapons began with bombs delivered by aircraft, followed by strategic ballistic missiles and smaller tactical weapons like artillery projectiles, land mines, antisubmarine depth charges, torpedoes, and shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles. The Cold War confrontation between the United States and its allies led to the peak of the American stockpile in 1966, with over 32,000 warheads of 30 different types.

IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency)

The IAEA strengthens the global nuclear safety and security framework. It identifies and promotes best practices and safety standards and implements programs to assist states in applying these standards. The IAEA is also a key player in the effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.

It provides a variety of advisory and support services to help states strengthen nuclear security, including by enhancing the security of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials, and reducing the risk that such material could be acquired by terrorists. Moreover, the IAEA enhances national, regional, and international capacities to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents, which is essential to minimizing their impact. In the event of an incident, the IAEA plays a lead role in providing timely and authoritative information to the international community.

The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. The Agency's genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953.



Nuclear Testing

Nuclear tests are generally controlled explosions of nuclear devices, such as bombs or warheads. The tests are used to determine a device's effectiveness, yield (amount of energy released during detonation) and explosive capability. There are four types of nuclear tests:

1. Atmospheric tests occur in or above the atmosphere.
2. Underground tests occur below the Earth's surface.
3. Upper atmospheric tests occur more than 30 kilometers off the ground.
4. Underwater tests occur under water or close to the surface.

Nuclear tests that occur above ground or under water would likely cause radiation to their immediate vicinity. If devices are buried far enough underground, a nuclear explosion may be contained to prevent the release of radiation into the atmosphere. However, if a device is not buried deeply enough, the explosion could cause the ground around it to explode, which would result in the release of radiation.

Underground Nuclear Testing

Underground nuclear testing is the test detonation of nuclear weapons that is performed underground. The testing device may be sufficiently underground to contain the nuclear explosion and prevent the discharge of radioactive elements into the atmosphere. The surrounding rock is altered by the intense heat and pressure of an underground nuclear explosion. The rock closest to the location of the test is vaporised, forming a cavity. Zones of crushed, broken, and permanently stressed rock can be found further away. After the explosion, the rock above the hole can crumble and create a chimney of rubble. A subsidence crater in the shape of a bowl might develop if this chimney rises to the surface.

The first underground test took place in 1951; further tests provided information that eventually led to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which banned all nuclear tests except for those performed underground. From then until the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, most nuclear tests were performed underground, in order to prevent nuclear fallout from entering into the atmosphere.

Another information related directly to the topic is the risks to other areas in the vicinity of a nuclear test are largely driven by the type of test being conducted. Atmospheric and underwater tests could lead to contamination of air and water. The biggest risk to areas in the immediate vicinity of an underground nuclear test is potential seismic activity, although there has been no documented case of a nuclear test causing an earthquake. Generally, nuclear test sites are located far from major population centers for that reason.

Sanction

Sanction is an action that is taken or an order that is given to force a country to obey international laws by limiting or stopping trade with that country, by not allowing economic aid for that country, etc.

The international community can use sanctions to change the behavior of a country or regime, in cases where that country or regime is violating human rights, waging war or endangering international peace and security. Sanctions can be imposed by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and individual states. In practice, sanctions are usually first instituted by the Security Council and later adopted by the EU in the form of Council decisions and regulations.

The purpose of the sanctions is often to change undesirable behavior, limit opportunities for undesirable behavior, and deter other countries from choosing an undesirable course of action.

Sanctions vary by country and situation.

Sanctions to DPRK

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has undertaken a broad range of activities over the years that has drawn international condemnation in the form of sanctions. Chief among them are the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

The fifteen-member UN Security Council has passed nearly a dozen resolutions, all unanimously, condemning North Korea for its nuclear pursuits and imposing sanctions. Over time, the measures have expanded as banning the trade of arms and military equipment, dual-use technologies, vehicles, industrial machinery, and metals; freezing the assets of individuals involved in the country's nuclear program; banning the import of certain luxury goods, the export of electrical equipment; coal, minerals, seafood and other food and agricultural products, wood, textiles, and stones; capping North Korean labor exports, imports of oil and refined petroleum products; banning natural gas imports; restricting fishing rights; restricting scientific and technical cooperation with North Korea; and prohibiting UN members from opening North Korean bank accounts and banking offices.

U.S., Australia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the European Union (EU), have sanctioned North Korea beyond the measures imposed by the UN Security Council. Each expanded their sanctions in 2022 in response to North Korea's increased missile testing.

C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Short History of Nuclear Testing

The history of nuclear testing began early on the morning of 16 July 1945 at a desert



test site in Alamogordo, New Mexico when the United States exploded its first atomic bomb. The United States launched the Nuclear Age in the pre-dawn hours of 16 July 1945 when it detonated a 20-kiloton atomic bomb code-named "Trinity" at Alamogordo, New Mexico. While the Alamogordo test demonstrated many of the explosion's effects, it failed to provide a meaningful

comprehension of radioactive nuclear fallout, which was not well understood by project scientists until years later.

The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan towards the end of World War II: one called "Little Boy" on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and another called "Fat Man" on Nagasaki on 9 August. Together these two bombs killed some 220,000 Japanese citizens outright, with over 200,000 more dying subsequently from lethal radiation overdoses.

No sooner was World War II brought to a close in August 1945 than an all-out technical-industrial nuclear weapons race ensued between the two newly emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Between 1946 and 1949, the United States conducted an additional six tests. Then on 29 August 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, "Joe 1". This test marked the beginning of the "Cold War" nuclear arms race between the two superpowers.

With the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb test on 29 August 1949, the "Cold War" nuclear arms race between the USSR and the United States was on.


At the outset, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had many nuclear weapons to spare so their nuclear testing was relatively limited. However, by the 1950s the United States had established a dedicated test site (Nevada Test Site) and was also using a site in the Marshall Islands (Pacific Proving Grounds) for extensive nuclear testing.

The Soviet Union also began testing on a limited scale, primarily in Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. Early tests were used primarily to ascertain the military effects of nuclear weapons and to test new weapon designs.

The United Kingdom became the third country to test nuclear weapons on 3 October 1952. Initially, the United Kingdom tested mainly in Australia and later on in the United States.

On 1 November 1952 the United States became the first country to test a hydrogen bomb. The Castle Bravo test on 1 March 1954 yielded 15 megatons and was the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated by the United States.

From 1955 to 1989, the average number of nuclear tests conducted every year was 55. Nuclear testing peaked in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The year 1962 alone saw as many as 178 tests: 96 conducted by the United States and 79 by the Soviet Union. The preceding year had seen the testing of the largest nuclear weapon ever exploded, the Soviet Union's "Tsar Bomba" with an estimated yield of 50 megatons. It was tested at the Novaya Zemlya test site near the Arctic Circle.



France and China became nuclear weapon States in 1960 and 1964 respectively. France initially tested in Algeria, and later on in the South Pacific. China conducted all its nuclear tests at Lop Nur in Xinjiang Province.

The early 1960s also saw the introduction of the only testing limitation effort that had concrete effects on how testing was conducted during the Cold War. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear testing for military and peaceful purposes, in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space.

On the other hand, the world's nuclear arsenals ballooned throughout the Cold War, from slightly more than 3,000 weapons in 1955 to over 37,000 weapons by 1965 (United States 31,000 and the Soviet Union 6,000), to 47,000 by 1975 (United

States 27,000 and the Soviet Union 20,000), and over 60,000 in the late 1980s (United States 23,000 and the Soviet Union 39,000). The world did not witness any significant decrease in nuclear testing activities and nuclear weapons acquisition among the nuclear weapon States until the early 1990s. The total number of nuclear tests in the second half of the 1980s amounted to as many as 174.

Ten nuclear tests were conducted between 1998 and 2017: two by India and two by Pakistan in 1998 and six by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2006, 2009, 2013, two in 2016, and in 2017, thus breaking the de facto moratorium that the CTBT had established.

India conducted two underground nuclear tests, code-named "Shakti (Power) '98", on 11 and 13 May 1998 at its Pokhran underground testing site. In contrast to India's initial nuclear test in 1974, this time there were no claims that these were "peaceful tests". On the contrary, government officials were quick to emphasize the military nature of the explosions.

A scant two weeks later, Pakistan reacted, conducting two underground nuclear tests at its Ras Koh range. Both India and Pakistan immediately moved to announce unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing and have conducted no nuclear tests since 1998.

History of Nuclear Testing in DPRK

North Korea began its nuclear program in the early 1950s. In December 1952, the government established the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Academy of Sciences, but nuclear work only began to progress when North Korea established cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union. Pyongyang signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in February 1956, and began to send scientists and technicians to the USSR for training shortly thereafter.

In 1959, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that included a provision for Soviet help to establish a nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province.

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided extensive technical assistance to North Korea in constructing the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which included the installation of a Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor and associated facilities. North Korea used this small research reactor to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel.

In the late 1960s, North Korea expanded its educational and research institutions to support a nuclear program for both civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, North Korean engineers were using indigenous technology to expand the IRT-2000 research reactor, and Pyongyang had begun to acquire plutonium reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union.

6 In July 1977, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000 research reactor and a critical assembly in Yongbyon under IAEA safeguards. The Soviets were included in the agreement because they supplied the reactor's fuel.

North Korea began experimenting with the high explosives tests required for building the triggering mechanism of a nuclear bomb. By the mid-1980s, the country had begun constructing a 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, while also expanding its uranium processing facilities.

The DPRK also explored the acquisition of light water reactor (LWR) technology in the early to mid-1980s. This period coincided with the expansion of North Korea's indigenously designed reactor program, which was based on gas-graphite-moderated reactors similar in design to the Calder Hall reactors first built in the United Kingdom in the 1950s. North Korea agreed to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in December 1985 in exchange for Soviet assistance in constructing four LWRs.

In September 1991, North Korea and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, whereby both sides promised they would "not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." The agreement additionally bound the two sides to forgo the possession of "nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." The agreement also provided for a bilateral inspection regime, **but the two sides failed to agree on its implementation.**

North Korea signed an IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, and the Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement on 9 April 1992. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an initial declaration of its nuclear facilities and materials, and provided access for IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of its declaration.

After the IAEA was denied access to North Korea's suspected waste sites in early 1993, the Agency asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to authorize

special ad hoc inspections. **In reaction, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993.** Under the terms of the treaty, a state's withdrawal does not take effect until 90 days after it has given notice. Following intense bilateral negotiations with the United States, North Korea announced it was suspending its withdrawal from the NPT one day before the withdrawal was to take effect. Pyongyang agreed to suspend its withdrawal while talks continued with Washington, but claimed to have a special status in regard to its nuclear safeguards commitments. Under this special status, North Korea agreed to allow the continuity of safeguards on its present activities, but refused to allow inspections that could verify past nuclear activities.

As talks with the United States over North Korea's return to the NPT dragged on, North Korea continued to operate its 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon. On 14 May 1994, Korean technicians began removing the reactor's spent fuel rods without the supervision of IAEA inspectors. This action worsened the crisis because the random placement of the spent fuel rods in a temporary storage pond compromised the IAEA's capacity to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor, which could have been used in efforts to account for the discrepancies in Pyongyang's reported plutonium reprocessing.

The crisis was defused in June 1994 when former U.S. President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il Sung. Carter announced from Pyongyang that Kim had accepted the broad outline of a deal that was later finalized as the Agreed Framework in October 1994. Under the agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze work at its gas-graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, and to allow the IAEA to monitor that freeze. Pyongyang was also required to "consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and to remain a party to the NPT. In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light water power reactors, and to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor came online with a target date of 2003.

The international community also became concerned that North Korea might have an illicit highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. In summer 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence of HEU technology and/or materials transfers from Pakistan to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology. (Later, in early 2004, it was revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan had sold gas-centrifuge technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran.)

Around this time, North Korea began construction of the covert uranium enrichment facility at Kangson in the outskirts of Pyongyang. Although U.S. intelligence was

reportedly aware of the site, its existence was only revealed to the public in July 2018 through the efforts of open-source analysts.

In early 2003, U.S. intelligence detected activities around the Radiochemistry Laboratory, a reprocessing facility in Yongbyon, which indicated that North Korea was probably reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary storage pond.

In September 2003, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that North Korea had completed the reprocessing of this spent fuel—this would have given North Korea enough plutonium for approximately four to six nuclear devices.

In January 2004, a delegation of invited U.S. experts confirmed that the canisters in the temporary storage pond were empty.

In April 2003, a multilateral dialogue began in Beijing with the aim of ending Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Initially trilateral in format (China, North Korea and the United States), the process expanded to a six-party format with the inclusion of Japan, Russia and South Korea. The first round began in August 2003. Six months later, in February 2004, the second round of talks was held, and a third round followed in June 2004. However, tensions between the parties—particularly the United States and North Korea—caused the talks to stall for more than a year, restarting in July 2005.

While the six-party process stagnated, North Korea shut down its 5MW(e) reactor in April 2005 and removed the spent fuel. The reactor had been operating since February 2003, meaning that it could have produced enough plutonium for between one and three nuclear devices in its spent fuel. However, it would take a few months for North Korean engineers to extract the plutonium from the spent fuel rods. In July 2005, satellite imagery indicated that the reactor had begun operations once again.

The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula continued to deteriorate throughout 2006, reaching a low point in October when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test at 10:35 AM (local time) at the Punggye-ri test site. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that the test was conducted at a “stirring time when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation.” The North Korean nuclear test did not, however, produce a significant yield. The yield from this test appeared to be less than 1 kiloton. North Korea was reportedly expecting at least a 4-kiloton yield, possibly indicating that the North Korean plutonium program still had a number of technical hurdles to overcome before it would have a nuclear warhead.

Immediately following the test, **UNSC Resolution 1718** imposed sanctions on North Korea. After intense diplomatic activities by the Chinese government and others involved in the Six-Party process, the parties met again in December 2006 following a hiatus of more than a year. However, these talks ended without any sign of progress.

In what appeared to be a breakthrough in the negotiations, the six parties in February 2007 agreed on the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, whereby North Korea agreed to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime in exchange for a package of incentives that included the provision of energy assistance to North Korea by the other parties.

After the February 2007 agreement, North Korea extended invitations to IAEA officials, opening the door to re-establishing its relationship with the Agency. In July 2007, North Korea began shutting down and sealing its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA supervision. Further progress was made in the Six-Party Talks when the parties adopted the Second Action Plan, calling on North Korea to disable its main nuclear facilities and submit a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by 31 December 2007.

In October 2008, the United States finally dropped North Korea from the terrorism list after reaching a deal in which North Korea agreed to resume the disabling of its nuclear facilities, and to allow inspectors access to the nuclear sites. The six parties then resumed negotiations to map out a verification plan in Beijing in December 2008. These negotiations focused on ways to verify the disablement of North Korea's nuclear program, including taking nuclear samples. However, the negotiations failed to reach an agreement on a verification protocol, and the issue remains stalled.

Tensions continued to rise in 2010 and 2011. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il visited China three times within one year, each time indicating he was willing to proceed with denuclearization efforts; however, North Korea also engaged in several military confrontations with the South.

In March 2010, North Korea torpedoed a South Korean ship killing 46 sailors, and in November of the same year, it shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing four South Koreans, including two civilians.

Additionally, in March 2010, North Korea announced the construction of a light-water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon. U.S. nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker confirmed that construction for a 25-30MW(e) experimental LWR had commenced during his November 2010 visit.

In November 2011 analysts estimated that the experimental LWR might be externally completed within the next year, but operations were unlikely to begin for another two to three years as machinery and equipment would need to be loaded and installed.

North Korea successfully launched an additional Unha rocket in December 2012, leading the **UN Security Council to follow up with Resolution 2087** demanding North Korea end its nuclear and missile programs.

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted a third nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility. The USGS reported a 5.1 magnitude seismic shock in the vicinity of the test site. North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a “lighter, miniaturized atomic bomb.”

On 6 January 2016, North Korea announced it had successfully tested a thermonuclear device at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. The test registered as a 5.1 magnitude earthquake according to the USGS; given that the magnitude was similar to the 2013 test, most experts believe that North Korea tested a fission device similar in yield to the 2013 test instead of a thermonuclear device as it had claimed.

On 9 March 2016, North Korea released photographs depicting Kim Jong Un examining what the DPRK claims is a miniaturized nuclear implosion device in front of several partially assembled KN-08 mod 1 and mod 2 missiles. Six days later, on 15 March 2016, North Korea announced its intention to conduct another nuclear test. North Korea later announced in August what U.S. experts had long suspected, that it had restarted reprocessing spent fuel rods, creating more plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.

On 9 September 2016, North Korea carried out its fifth nuclear test to coincide with the 68th anniversary of the founding of North Korea. 84 The U.S. Geological Survey registered the test as a 5.3 magnitude earthquake. The yield appears to be larger than all previous tests carried out by the regime, with most estimates placing the yield between 10 and 20 kilotons. Even China, North Korea’s only major ally, condemned the test and called on North Korea to refrain from provocative acts. At an emergency meeting following the 9 September test, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted **Resolution 2321** on 30 November 2016.

In 2017, tensions escalated when North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and its first intercontinental ballistic missile test.

In 2018, various factors helped reduce the potential for conflict and create an opening for diplomacy. South Korea hosted the Winter Olympics in 2018 and President Moon

Jae-in invited North Korean participation, leading to senior-level talks and three inter-Korean summits. Kim, claiming North Korea's nuclear force development was complete, announced a strategic shift toward economic development and began a charm offensive. In addition, President Trump made unconventional decisions to suspend major joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises and meet directly with Chairman Kim in Singapore — marking the first-ever meeting between a sitting U.S. president and a North Korean leader.

At the historic Singapore Summit in June 2018, the United States and North Korea committed to establish “new U.S.-DPRK relations” and North Korea also committed to work toward the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” However, the two countries disagreed about what each side should concede and when, leading to a diplomatic failure at the second summit in Hanoi in February 2019.

D. CURRENT ACTIONS BY STATES AND ORGANS

Today, the diplomatic stalemate continues, and tensions are increasing. North Korea has resumed the development of its military deterrence capabilities, including the most ballistic missile tests in any year. In response, the United States and South Korea agreed to expand the scale and scope of combined military exercises and redeploy U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. The present challenge is how to shift away from this vicious cycle of tension into a virtuous cycle of accommodation.

But the relations are not only remaining it's activeness with US. and DPRK.

As an example, the EU strongly condemns the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) launch of a new type of long-range ballistic missile on 13 April. The DPRK's repeated demonstrations of its intention to continue developing the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction threaten international peace and security. The DPRK must cease all illegal and dangerous actions that violate UN Security Council resolutions and recklessly escalate military tensions in the region. The EU reiterates that the DPRK must comply immediately with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programs, and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and cease all related activities. This is the only viable route to sustainable peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any other special status in that regard. The EU urges the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol, and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The DPRK's use of resources to support its unlawful weapons programs exacerbates the difficult living conditions endured by much of its population.

Besides, the situation concerning DPRK had a deep detail which concerns underground nuclear testing. Since the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, the world's major nuclear powers have tested their weapons underground. The treaty barred nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, or underwater. Underground nuclear testing contained some countries -not only DPRK- as the U.S. and the Soviet Union conducted hundreds of underground nuclear tests; all in all, from 1945 to 1998, the U.S. performed 215 tests above ground and 815 underground.

Furthermore, for further examining the relations and opinions, we must check out the basics of IAEA Safeguards, and the treaties established before and still remains its importance.

IAEA Safeguards

Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international commitment not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear-weapons purposes. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other treaties against the spread of nuclear weapons entrust the IAEA as the nuclear inspectorate. Today, the IAEA safeguards nuclear material and activities under agreements with more than 140 States.

Within the world's nuclear non-proliferation regime, the IAEA's safeguards system functions as a confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community if and when the need arises.

Over the past decade, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened in key areas. Measures aim to increase the likelihood of detecting a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and to build confidence that States are abiding by their international commitments.

Safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of a State's declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets of measures are carried out in accordance with the type of safeguards agreements in force with a State.

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.

The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear testing everywhere on the planet — surface, atmosphere, underwater and underground. The Treaty takes on significance as it also aims to obstruct the development of nuclear weapons: both the initial development of nuclear weapons as well as their substantial improvement (e.g. the advent of thermonuclear weapons) necessitate real nuclear testing. The CTBT makes it almost impossible for countries that do not yet have nuclear weapons to develop them. And it makes it almost impossible for countries that have nuclear weapons to develop new or more advanced weapons. It also helps prevent the damage caused by nuclear testing to humans and the environment.

All 44 States specifically listed in the Treaty — those with nuclear technology capabilities at the time of the final Treaty negotiations in 1996 — must sign and ratify before the CTBT can enter into force.

Of these, eight are still missing: China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the USA. DPRK, India and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT. Otherwise, as of August 2023, 186 countries have signed, of which 178 have ratified the Treaty. Since the Treaty is not yet in force, the Organization is called the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization, or CTBTO. It was founded in 1996, with approximately 260 staff from most of the CTBTO's 196 Member States. It is headed by the Executive Secretary, Dr. Robert Floyd (Australia). The CTBTO's main tasks are the promotion of the Treaty and the build-up of the verification regime so that it is operational when the Treaty enters into force.

The Test Ban Treaty

The Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963; ratified by the United States Senate on September 24, 1963; and entered into force on October 10, 1963. The treaty prohibited nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. While not banning tests underground, the treaty prohibited such explosions if they caused "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted. In accepting limitations on testing, the nuclear powers accepted as a common goal "an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances."

In August of 1945, when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, World War II came to a conclusion.

Continued testing of atomic and then hydrogen devices lead to a rising concern about the effects of radioactive fallout. As knowledge of the nature and effects of fallout increased, and as it became apparent that no region in the world was untouched by radioactive debris, the issue of continued nuclear tests drew widened and intensified public attention. Apprehension was expressed about the possibility of a cumulative contamination of the environment and of resultant genetic damage.

Efforts to negotiate an international agreement to end nuclear tests began in the Subcommittee of Five (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union) of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in May 1955. Public interest in the course of the negotiations was active and persistent. A dozen resolutions of the UN General Assembly addressed the issue, repeatedly urging conclusion of an agreement to ban tests under a system of international controls. Efforts to achieve a test ban agreement extended over eight years because they involved complex technical problems of verification and the difficulties of reconciling

deep-seated differences in approach to arms control and security. The uneven progress of the negotiations was also a result of regular fluctuations in East-West political relationships during the Cold War.

UNSC Resolution 1718

It is the resolution that published the decision of:

“

8. Decides that:

(a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of

...

(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items ...

(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources...

(e) All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

...

14. Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States;

15. Affirms that it shall keep DPRK's actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 above, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK's compliance with the provisions of the resolution;”

UNSC Resolution 2087

It is the resolution that decides the condemnation of DPRK originating their nuclear actions and restating past resolutions.

UNSC Resolution 2321

It is the resolution that mostly restates what has been decided with past resolutions and newly decides:

“

2. Reaffirms its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

...

11. Decides that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless:

(a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or

(b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and notifies the Committee in advance of such determination

...

18. Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the DPRK from using real property that it owns or leases in their territory for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities;

...

30. Decides that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply,

sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters and vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

“

E. CLOSING STATEMENTS AND POINTS TO COVER

To come to a conclusion, in today's world there is a reality of nuclear testing. And in this frightening reality, there are leading countries starting with DPRK(aka North Korea). Upon the issue, as you may examine in this paper, treaties, safeguards and a lot of resolutions have been passed.

But still, the actions from DPRK and many countries that haven't signed or clarified CTBT keep its activeness at high-levels.

Since nuclear testing -specifically underground nuclear testing- remains its risks with the past and current proofs, the UNSC should come up with a new and more comprehensive resolution to the matter.

In LegacyMUN'23, as the Under-Secretary-General, I expect delegates to have a clear focus on;

1. Encouraging States that haven't signed or clarified the CTBT to come up with actions upon considering signing and clarifying the treaty.
2. In case of negativity from States that haven't signed or clarified the CTBT, establishing reforms on CTBT in the circumstances of IAEA safeguards and past UNSC resolutions.
3. Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only country to have withdrawn from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to pursue a nuclear weapons program and possesses an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal, the committee shall have a discussion of this action and consider this while coming up with a resolution.
4. Having new clear agreements with outlines for underground nuclear testing.
5. Reconsidering sanctions to DPRK that have been established in past UNSC resolutions according to possible actions that have been explained in these clauses.
6. Since the focus in this agenda item is on DPRK and State's actions, while completing the clauses having a main focus on those actions.

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Agenda Item B: Resolving the matter pertaining to the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA ITEM

The status of Nagorno-Karabakh and its area basically have kind of long been up for discussion on the generally international political scene, which essentially is quite significant. The longest-running war in post-Soviet Eurasia mostly is the one in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is quite significant. Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia increased and mostly persisted throughout time. The occurrence of conflicts and border transgressions marked the beginning of the severe events, which is quite significant. Due to Karabakh's kind of present ambiguous status following the Second Karabakh War and its unique location inside the blockaded Lachin Corridor, the area literally is now dealing with an internal sort of humanitarian catastrophe in a subtle way. Furthermore, both States haven't agreed on a visible peace treaty and owing to this uncertainty most of the issues mentioned are not being able to get resolved. The rights of people accommodating on the region is also a tremendous question mark under the laws.

B. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Nagorno-Karabakh

Nagorno-Karabakh, also spelled Nagorno-Karabach, Azerbaijani Dağlıq Qarabağ, Armenian Artsakh, region of southwestern Azerbaijan.

The word 'Nagorno' drives from the Russian word 'Nagorny,' which means 'Mountainous.' The Russian/Soviet sources often call the territory 'Nagorny Karabakh' or the 'NKAO,' which is the Soviet abbreviation which translates as 'Autonomous Territory of Mountainous Karabakh.' In Azerbaijan, the territory is stated as 'Daghlig,' which means 'Upper or Mountainous Karabakh.' The Armenians gave an ancient name to this region, 'Artsakh.' Finally, the newly designed government in the territory called it the 'Nagorno Karabakh Republic' (Sienrukos, 2006).

The name is also used to refer to an autonomous oblast (province) of the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R.) and to the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, a self-declared country whose independence is not internationally recognized. The old autonomous region occupied an area of about 1,700 square miles (4,400 square km), while the forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh presently occupy some 2,700 square miles (7,000 square km). The general region includes the northeastern flank of the Karabakh Range of the Lesser

Caucasus and extends from the crest line of the range to the margin of the Kura River lowland at its foot.



Republic of Artashk

The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which also calls itself the Republic of Artsakh, has enjoyed de facto independence from Azerbaijan since a 1994 cease-fire agreement that ended roughly two years of open warfare, though its independence is not recognized by any UN Member States. Artsakh controls a part of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, including the capital of Stepanakert. It is an enclave within Azerbaijan. Its only overland access route to Armenia is via the 5 km (3.1 mi) wide Lachin corridor which is under the control of Russian peacekeepers.

The territory's population is mostly ethnic Armenians, and given its geographic and diplomatic isolation, it has been dependent on close political and economic ties with Armenia. However, a third of Nagorno-Karabakh and some adjacent land came under Azerbaijani control in 2020 under a cease-fire agreement that ended a weeks-long conflict that year.

The president is directly elected for up to two five-year terms and is both head of state and head of government, with authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members. The most recent presidential election took place in March and April 2020, several months before Azerbaijani forces started a war that finished with Stepanakert losing control of significant areas of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lachin Corridor

The Lachin corridor is a mountain road that links Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the length of a six-kilometers . Being the only road between these two territories, it is considered a humanitarian corridor or "lifeline" to the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.



The corridor is in the Lachin District of Azerbaijan, but is ostensibly under the control of a Russian peacekeeping force as provided for in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh armistice agreement. The territory of the corridor included the villages of Zabukh, Sus and the city of Lachin itself until 2022

Azerbaijan's ongoing blockade of the Lachin corridor, including its checkpoint, has been criticized by numerous countries, international organizations, and human rights groups many of which consider it a violation of the ceasefire agreement that ended the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which guarantees the

security of movement along the Lachin corridor in both directions.

Independence

Independence is the freedom from outside control or support, in other words the state of being independent means the time when a country or region gains political freedom from outside control.

Territory

A territory is a region of land, water, or space that basically is connected to or belongs to a fairly specific nation, individual, or creature, pretty contrary to popular belief.

A territory in pretty international politics is typically a region of land that mostly is governed by a for all intents and purposes sovereign state and does not generally have the authority to govern itself, which actually is fairly significant.

In most nations, a territory kind of is an fairly official division of a region that generally is under a nation's control but literally has not yet been formally developed or incorporated into one of the nation's political units, which specifically are on an for all intents and purposes equal footing with one another and literally are frequently referred to as "provinces," "regions," or "states"

In a kind of more very limited sense, it generally is "a geographical region, fairly such as a colonial possession, that for all intents and purposes is basically dependent on an external government."

Ceasefire

A ceasefire basically is a temporary halt to hostilities in which both sides consent to for all intents and purposes put an end to hostilities, very contrary to popular belief. Both state actors and non-state actors may particularly participate in cease-fires, or so they specifically thought.

In addition to being part of a formal treaty, ceasefires can also specifically be agreed upon informally by opposing forces, or so they definitely thought. They may definitely be imposed by United Nations Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, through mediation or another method as part of a peace process in a sort of major way.

C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MAJOR EVENTS

The conflict has roots dating back well over a century into competition between Christian particularly Armenian and Muslim Turkic and Persian influences, which actually is fairly significant.

Karabakh (especially Nogorny Karabakh) was initially depicted under the name of Arsakh-Artsakh. The etymology of Arsakh is related to the name of ancient Turkic tribe Sakh, containing two words such as "ar" and "sakh" that means sakh man, brave sakh, encourages sakh and the etymology of Artsakh in old Turkic languages, derives "art" and "sakh" which means sakh mountainous territory. Sakh people as an important ethnic component have been one of the "26 Albanian tribes" (26 tribes coexisted in Caucasian Albania). The scholars and historians have their different attitude about the origin of this tribe. Some of them suppose to concern the Sakh tribes to the Iranian language group, while the others assume that they are originally Turks.

The region of Nagorno-Karabakh was acquired by Russia in 1813. Throughout the time, Armenia and Azerbaijan became two former Soviet Union countries, which are located in the South Caucasus region. However the Azeri-Armenian dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh dates back from the early 1920s, just after the end of World War I when the great Ottoman Empire was on its death bed, led to large-scale conflicts and atrocities amongst Armenians and Turkish peoples.

And in 1923 the Soviet government established it as an Armenian-majority autonomous oblast of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Detached from the Armenian S.S.R. to the

west by the Karabakh Range, Nagorno-Karabakh thus became a minority enclave within Azerbaijan. The region developed quietly through decades of Soviet rule, but in 1988 the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh began agitating for the transfer of their oblast to Armenian jurisdiction, a demand that was strongly opposed by both the Azerbaijan S.S.R. and the Soviet government.

Ethnic antagonisms between Armenians and Azerbaijanis grew inflamed over the issue, and, when Armenia and Azerbaijan gained their independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the enclave went to war. In other words to lighten the cause of war, ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh demanded the transfer of what was then the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) from Soviet Azerbaijan to Armenia. As the Soviet Union collapsed, tensions grew into an outright war.

First Nagorno-Karabakh War

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War was an ethnic and particularly territorial conflict that took place from February 1988 to May 1994, in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, or so they thought. Azerbaijan attempted to quell the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh as the war dragged on, and Armenia and Azerbaijan, both definitely former Soviet Republics, became embroiled in protracted, unreported mountain warfare in the mountainous heights of Karabakh.

Stepanakert, the for all intents and purposes capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, mostly was intentionally bombed by artillery and aircraft during the winter of 1991–1992, when it was blockaded by Azerbaijani forces. The sort of interior minister of Nagorno-Karabakh asserted that 169 Armenians for all intents and purposes died between October 1991 and April 1992 as a result of the bombardment of Stepanakert and very nearby towns and villages that really were held by Armenians during the blockade, which kind of resulted in extensive destruction, or so they thought. During the bombardment, Azerbaijan employed weapons like the BM-21 Grad multiple-launch rocket system in a big way. Unpredictable aerial attacks and shelling terrorized the populace while destroying a generally large number of civilian structures, including homes, hospitals, and other non-legitimate basically military targets in a particularly big way.

According to Human Rights Watch, the towns of Khojaly and Shusha served as the main bases for the Azerbaijani armed forces during their bombardment of Stepanakert. International observers claim that the 366th CIS Regiment and a mixed force of ethnic

Armenians took control of Khojaly in February 1992. Khojaly was the scene of the biggest massacre committed during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War after it was taken. As they fled the town, at least 161 Azerbaijani civilians and a few unarmed hors de combat soldiers are believed to have been killed, according to Human Rights Watch. A few months later, in May 1992, when Armenian forces successfully captured Shusha, the siege was finally lifted.

On 26 January 1992, the Azerbaijani forces stationed in Shusha encircled and attacked the nearby Armenian village Karintak (located on the way from Shusha to Stepanakert) in an attempt to capture it. This operation was conducted by Azerbaijan's then-defence minister Tajedin Mekhtiev and was supposed to prepare the ground for a future attack on Stepanakert. The operation failed as the villagers and the Armenian fighters strongly retaliated. Mekhtiev was ambushed and up to 70 Azeri soldiers died. After this debacle, Mekhtiev left Shusha and was fired as defence minister.

On 8 May a force of several hundred Armenian troops accompanied by tanks and helicopters attacked Shusha. Fierce fighting took place in the town's streets and several hundred men were killed on both sides. Although the Armenians were outnumbered and outgunned by the Azerbaijani Army, they managed to capture the town and force the Azerbaijanis to retreat on 9 May.

The capture of Shusha resonated loudly in neighbouring Turkey. Its relations with Armenia had grown better after it had declared its independence from the Soviet Union; they gradually worsened as a result of Armenia's gains in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Turkey never sent troops to Azerbaijan but did contribute substantial military aid and advisers. In May 1992, the military commander of the CIS forces, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, issued a warning to Western nations, especially the United States, to not interfere with the conflict in the Caucasus, stating it would "place us [the Commonwealth] on the verge of a third world war and that cannot be allowed". Full-scale fighting erupted in early 1992. International mediation by several groups including the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) failed to bring an end resolution that both sides could work with. In early 1993, Armenian forces captured seven Azerbaijani-majority districts outside the enclave itself, threatening the involvement of other countries in the region.

In October 1993, Aliyev was formally elected president of Azerbaijan and promised to bring social order to the country in addition to recapturing the lost regions. In October, Azerbaijan joined the CIS. The winter season was marked with similar conditions as

in the previous year, both sides scavenging for wood and harvesting foodstuffs months in advance. Two subsequent **UNSC resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were passed, 874 and 884**, in October and November. Reemphasizing the same points as the previous two, they acknowledged Nagorno-Karabakh as a region of Azerbaijan.

A series of negotiations followed—guided by Russia and a committee informally known as the “Minsk Group” (named for an envisioned peace conference in Minsk, Belarus, that was not realized)—that failed to reach a lasting resolution but did manage to yield a cease-fire agreement in 1994, which, though periodically violated, was largely upheld.

Since 1994, The Minsk Group of the OSCE became the head of the mediator and proposed negotiations on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between both countries. A committee of three cochairs: the US, Russia, and France, had been formed over the dispute of Nagorno Karabakh for finding a final solution, but Azerbaijan’s regime refused to recognize and directly talk with the self-styled the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. These three countries want to maintain the peace in the disputed region to get their economic profit in the Oil and Gas industry from the Caspian Oil. Therefore, it was the priority of stability in the region, but these international communities didn’t reach any particular solution for the peace in the territory

As it might have acknowledged, from 1994 until 2020, intermittent deadly incidents, including the use of attack drones and heavy weaponry on the front lines and activities of special operations forces, demonstrated the ever-present risk that war would reignite. In April 2016, four days of intense fighting at the line of separation shook the region, killed hundreds on both sides, and foreshadowed what was to come.

Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2016

The Nagorno Karabakh War of 2016, also known as the ‘Four day War’ or April Clashes, started along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of contact in April 2016, between Artsakh Defence Army (backed by Armenia) and Azerbaijani Army.

Fighting broke out in the morning of 2 April. Azerbaijan’s forces launched an offensive into the territories occupied by Armenian forces (i.e. the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, strongly supported by the army of Armenia) from the north-east and the south-east. Although Baku claimed that the attack was a response to Armenian shelling civilian sites in Azerbaijan, it was most likely an attempt to break through or test the Armenian lines of defence, although not to actually retake Karabakh from Armenian hands.

The exact number of casualties is unknown; both sides have admitted to at least 60 dead soldiers and several civilians, and it is possible that the figures have been under-reported.

The intense fighting ended as suddenly as it began. In the middle of the day on 5 April, the parties to the conflict (first the Karabakh separatists, then Armenia, and lastly Azerbaijan) stated that hostilities were being suspended. The clashes ended with both sides unexpectedly announcing a ceasefire. At the same time a resumption of peace talks was announced.

In a referendum on 2017, voters approve a new constitution turning the government from a semi-presidential to a fully presidential one. The territory changes its name from Nagorno Karabakh Republic to Republic of Artsakh, though both remain official names.

Karabakh is the Russian rendering of an Azeri word meaning "black garden", while Nagorno is a Russian root meaning "mountainous". Artsakh is an ancient Armenian name for the area.

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020

The long-standing tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the South Caucasus, which became a frozen conflict for many years due to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, evolved into an armed conflict in the last months of 2020. This conflict is known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and lasted for 44 days. This war caused many

casualties for both sides and ended with the Armistice Agreement signed on November 9, 2020.



On 27 September 2020, an entrenched dynamic of escalation culminated in an all-out war between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the contested territory of Nagorny Karabakh.

Drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery, and missile strikes essentially were used in the conflict, along with state propaganda and the use of for all intents and purposes

official definitely social media accounts for online information warfare, which for all intents and purposes is quite significant. In particular, it literally was definitely believed that Azerbaijan"s extensive use of drones definitely played a significant role in how the conflict definitely turned out, which is quite significant.

On 9 November 2020, in the aftermath of the capture of Shusha, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, ending all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 10 November 2020, 00:00 Moscow time. The President of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, also agreed to end the hostilities.

After the 2020 war, the front line has become longer and more volatile than before. Opposing military positions are separated from one another by only 30-100 metres. Before the 2020 war, they were hundreds of metres apart. The front line's movement has placed military positions up against civilian settlements. The Russian peacekeeping mission's outposts are deployed along the main roads in Armenian-populated areas of the conflict zone and the main traffic artery between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, including inside the Lachin corridor. The joint Russian-Turkish monitoring centre established as part of the November 2020 agreement, sits in Azerbaijani territory about 20km from the front line.

D. LATEST AGREEMENTS AND CURRENT SITUATION

As the most significant and current agreement, we must investigate the informal translation of the text of the agreement between the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as published on the website of the president of Russia (in Russian) on 10 November 2020.

“We, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan I. G. Aliyev, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia N. V. Pashinyan and the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin, have declared the following:

1. A complete ceasefire and all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are announced from 00:00 Moscow time on November 10, 2020. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, stop at their positions.

2. The Aghdam region is returned to the Republic of Azerbaijan until November 20, 2020.

3. *Along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor, a peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is deployed in the amount of 1,960 servicemen with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers, 380 units of automobile and special equipment.*

4. *The peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is being deployed in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces. The duration of the stay of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is 5 years, with automatic extension for the next 5-year periods, if none of the Parties declares 6 months before the expiration of the period of intention to terminate the application of this provision.*

5. *In order to increase the effectiveness of control over the implementation of the agreements by the Parties to the conflict, a peacekeeping center is being deployed to control the ceasefire.*

6. *The Republic of Armenia will return the Kelbajar region to the Republic of Azerbaijan by November 15, 2020, and the Lachin region by December 1, 2020. The Lachin corridor (5 km wide), which will ensure the connection of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and at the same time will not affect the city of Shusha, remains under the control of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation.*

By agreement of the Parties, a plan for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor will be determined in the next three years, providing communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, with the subsequent redeployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to protect this route.

The Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees the safety of traffic along the Lachin corridor of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions.

7. Internally displaced persons and refugees are returning to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the control of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

8. *There is an exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons and bodies of the dead.*

9. *All economic and transport links in the region are unblocked. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic in order to*

organize the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. Control over transport communication is carried out by the bodies of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia.

By agreement of the Parties, the construction of new transport communications linking the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be provided.”

In 2022, the risk of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan increased due to the failure of mediation efforts, increased militarization, and frequent ceasefire violations. Periodic violations of the 2020 ceasefire eventually escalated into a two-day conflict beginning September 13, 2022—the most significant provocation since 2020. The death toll has been disputed, with estimates ranging from one to three hundred killed in the cross-border attacks. Azerbaijan launched attacks on several locations inside Armenian territory, which forced the evacuation of more than 2,700 civilians. Armenia and Azerbaijan have exchanged accusations of blame for initiating the violence. Despite its focus on the conflict in Ukraine, Russia claimed credit for mediating a truce between the warring parties. Additional border clashes were reported on September 21, September 23, and September 28, less than one week after the Russian-brokered.

In December 2022, Azerbaijani activists occupied the Lachin corridor, ostensibly protesting environmental degradation caused by illegal mining in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the protesters reportedly had state backing from Baku, and they blocked all traffic except for Red Cross and Russian convoys. The Russian peacekeepers, in place to ensure the artery remains open for Armenian supplies, were unwilling or unable to secure and reopen the highway. As a result, residents in Nagorno-Karabakh faced severe shortages and rationing.

On 23 April, 2023, Baku opened a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, a highway traversing Azerbaijani territory that is the only road connecting Armenia to the ethnic Armenian-populated sections of Nagorno-Karabakh. Subsequent clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenian forces in May resulted in at least three fatalities. The clashes came two and a half years after a bloody six-week war pushed Armenian forces out of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. Ethnic Armenian residents fled for Armenia or the part of Nagorno-Karabakh where Russian peacekeeping forces had deployed after the war, in accordance with a trilateral armistice signed by Baku, Yerevan and Moscow. -Previously, the area had been under Armenian control for nearly three decades, following the two countries' previous full-scale war in the early 1990s.-

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in and around Nagorno-Karabakh escalated throughout 2022. The year saw three significant surges of violence specifically related to Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as a skirmish on Armenia's side of its state border with Azerbaijan.

Then, starting in mid-December, Baku-backed activists set up a blockade along the Lachin corridor, disrupting regular traffic, initially on the pretext of protesting mining activity. The blockade hindered Nagorno-Karabakh residents access to basic necessities. The Russian peacekeeping mission escorted supplies through the blockade, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delivered aid and facilitated the movement of people in need of urgent medical help.

Before Baku set up the checkpoint, the parallel diplomatic efforts had generated two draft peace deals between the neighbours, one proposed by Russia and the other developed by Azerbaijan and Armenia under EU and U.S. auspices. Key issues in talks include how to protect the rights and safety of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Baku seeks to assert control. Yerevan, Moscow and Western capitals are pressing Baku - thus far, unsuccessfully - to offer security assurances to ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. In particular, they have called for guarantees that these residents will be safe if they remain in their home region. Baku has not wanted to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh residents' status in talks with Yerevan, saying they will have the same security assurances as all Azerbaijani citizens.

The checkpoint changes a status quo under which Russian peacekeeping forces regulated traffic along the Lachin corridor. This arrangement was in line with the 2020 ceasefire agreement - signed by Baku, Yerevan and Moscow - which stated that Russian peacekeepers would deploy along that road to control it. Baku has justified its actions by pointing to language in the agreement declaring Azerbaijan responsible for the security of people, vehicles and cargo along the corridor. Its co-signatories Armenia and Russia disagree with this interpretation, arguing that the armistice clearly makes Russian peacekeepers responsible for the corridor, an interpretation Baku seemed to accept until recently, although it also alleged that the peacekeepers were not adequately fulfilling their duties.

Since installing its checkpoint, Baku has emphasised that it will maintain conditions for "transparent, safe and regulated passage of people, vehicles and cargo through the checkpoint and that it will coordinate with Russian peacekeepers who continue to patrol the corridor. It is not clear what Azerbaijan has done to date to establish such coordination.

By installing the checkpoint, Baku fulfilled its obligations to ensure the safety of its citizens. At the same time, Baku made it clear that Armenia should once and for all understand that there is no place for armed Armenian formations, terrorists, or saboteurs on the territory of Azerbaijan.

It underlined that the protection of sovereign territories and ensuring control at border crossing points is the sovereign and inalienable right of every state.

E. CLOSING STATEMENTS AND POINTS TO COVER

In conclusion, the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the current comebacks serves as a very stark reminder of the definitely complex geopolitical and historical factors that actually continue to shape regional conflicts in the 21st century.

As it was previously mentioned in this guide, when we check out the latest ceasefire and actions made by states there are a few shall be discussed by the delegates of LegacyMUN'23.

1. The political status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artashk) is a major question to come up with a significant agreement.
2. Matter of Lachin Corridor is also something to be further discussed and investigated. A new treaty or agreement upon the usage of road/checkpoint shall be a matter of concern by delegates. Meanwhile, the significance of humanitarian aid is a concern to be taken into consideration.
3. As it states at the ceasefire of 2020, "*Internally displaced persons and refugees are returning to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the control of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.*" shall be further examined and resolved with reforms and certain agreements.

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